#Attacks on smart grids trial

In order to prevent this, a PMU was set up at each end of the transmission lines with a direct communications link between them. If a fault occurs in which both of the 400-kV lines are lost, then the hydroelectric generators may experience angular instability. This transmission line links together large hydroelectric generators in Agostura to large loads in Chicoasen through two 400-kV transmission lines and one 115-kV transmission line. In the article, the authors also describe the consequences of a successful spoofing attack on the example of Chicoasen-Angostura transmission link in Mexico. Image source: “Going Up Against Time: The Power Grid’s Vulnerability to GPS Spoofing Attacks” The authors explain the offset of the PPS and phase shift that happened during the attack in image #6. Point 5 establishes when the spoofed signal was removed. Point 4 indicates where the spoofer-induced velocity has reached its maximum value for the test. Point 3 demonstrates the IEEE C37.118 Standard has been broken. Point 2 marks the point at which the spoofer has completely captured the victim’s receiver. Generally, the phase angle difference would be almost zero in the absence of a spoofing attack. Image # 3 illustrates a plot of the phase angle difference between the reference and the spoofed PMUs: Image source: “Going Up Against Time: The Power Grid’s Vulnerability to GPS Spoofing Attacks” As a result, civil spoofers are capable of causing control schemes to falsely trip generators, which can potentially lead to corresponding power faults and blackouts. In the tests, it was validated that a phasor measurement unit can violate the IEEE C37.118 Standard for synchrophasors within 11 minutes from the outset of a spoofing attack. Thus, the phase offset can be produced in the synchrophasor data coming from the phasor measurement unit. The spoofer is capable of introducing a time offset in the time reference receiver, which provides the timing signal for a phasor measurement unit without physical access to the corresponding receiver. The used spoofer was an advanced version of the spoofer reported in “Assessing the Spoofing Threat,” GPS World, January 2009.Īuthors came to the conclusion that both cable-only and the over-the-air spoofing attacks can be realized by means of a civil-grade and easily accessible spoofer that can compromise the PMU phase measurements. Two experiments were conducted: “Cable-only” and “Over-the-air” spoofing attacks.

#Attacks on smart grids trial

The article “Going Up Against Time: The Power Grid’s Vulnerability to GPS Spoofing Attacks” provides an example of a successful trial of a spoofing attack on phasor measurement units (PMU). The first research on the vulnerability of power grids to spoofing attacks were conducted by Daniel P. “ Going Up Against Time: The Power Grid’s Vulnerability to GPS Spoofing Attacks” by Daniel P. Due to the criticality of the power system and the likelihood of future smart grid reliance on high-precision timing, resilience of the GNSS signals to interference, and increasingly to jamming and spoofing, is crucial. The rapid detection of intentional and unintentional time anomalies was identified by several utilities as a key near-term requirement. Phasor Measurement Units), to enable real-time automatic control of the grid. GNSS receivers are low-cost, reliable, high-precision timing sources that can be implemented in a large number of intelligent grid sensors (i.e. Today grid systems rely on GNSS clocks as time reference sources and atomic clocks as a backup in case of outages. In the future, grid systems will require sub-microsecond level accuracy at power substations to implement automatic network management and protection relay functions, and to support fault detection and performance measurements. It is in accordance with the “GALILEO for TIMING and SYNCHRONISATION APPLICATIONS” article: This article is an overview of available publications on the vulnerability of power grids to spoofing attacks.